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ABSTRACT
We  study  a  variation  of  the  Eaton-Kortum  model,  a  competitive,  constant-returns-to-scale
multicountry Ricardian model of trade. We establish existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
with balanced trade where each country imposes an import tariff. We analyze the determinants of
the cross-country distribution of trade volumes, such as size, tariffs and distance, and compare a
calibrated version of the model with data for the largest 60 economies. We use the calibrated model
to estimate the gains of a world-wide trade elimination of tariffs, using the theory to explain the
magnitude of the gains as well as the differential effect arising from cross-country differences in pre-
liberalization of tariffs levels and country size.
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Eaton and Kortum (2002) have proposed a new theory of international trade,
an economical and versatile parameterization of the models with a continuum of
tradeable goods that Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) and Wilson (1980)
introduced many years ago. In the theory, constant-returns producers in diﬀerent
countries are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Buyers of any good search
over producers in diﬀerent countries for the lowest price, and trade assigns production
of any good to the most eﬃcient producers, subject to costs of transportation and
other impediments. The gains from trade are larger the larger is the variance of
individual productivities, which is the key parameter in the model.
The model shares with those of the “new trade theory” the important ability to
deal sensibly with intra-industry trade: trade in similar categories of goods between
similarly endowed countries. But unlike the earlier theory, the Eaton-Kortum (2002)
model is competitive, involving no ﬁxed costs and no monopoly rents.2 Of course,
ﬁxed costs and monopoly rents are present in reality, but theories based on compet-
itive behavior are much simpler to calibrate and permit the use of a large body of
general equilibrium theory to help in analysis.
One aim of this paper is to restate the economic logic of a variation of the
Eaton-Kortum model of trade in a particular general equilibrium context. In the next
section, we will introduce the basic ideas using a closed economy with a production
technology of the Eaton-Kortum type. In Section 3, we deﬁne an equilibrium with
balanced trade in a world with many countries, each one imposing import tariﬀs.
Section 4 gives suﬃcient conditions for this equilibrium to exist. The problem of
determining whether the equilibrium is unique and of ﬁnding an algorithm to compute
2See, for example, Ethier (1979, 1982), Krugman (1979), Helpman (1981), and the Helpman and
Krugman (1985) monograph. Baxter (1992) argues that competitive, Ricardian models are equally
capable of dealing realistically with intra-industry trade.
3it is addressed in Section 5.
A second goal of the paper is to ﬁnd out whether the cross-country distribution
of trade volumes generated by a model of this type is consistent with the behavior
of volumes in the data. In Section 6, we calibrate some of the main parameters of
the theory. Section 7 discusses some instructive special cases that are simple enough
to work out by hand. Using estimates from Section 6, we examine the implications
of these special cases of the theory for the volume of trade, and the way that trade
volume behaves as a function of size, and compare these implications to data on total
GDP and trade volumes for the 60 largest economies. Sections 8 and 10 go over
the same ground numerically with more realistic assumptions. In these two sections
we apply the algorithm described in Section 5, calibrate the model to the observed
distribution of GDPs and the relative prices of tradeables to non-tradeable goods,
and introduce heterogeneity in transportation costs and tariﬀ rates.
Our normative goal is to use the quantitative theory to estimate the welfare
gains from hypothetical trade liberalizations. Comparisons between free trade and
autarchy are carried out in Sections 7. Section 9 studies the optimal tariﬀ policy of
a small economy. We also calculate the eﬀects of a world-wide liberalization in which
every country’s tariﬀs are set to zero. We use the theory to explain the magnitude of
the average gains of trade, as well as diﬀerential eﬀects arising from cross-country dif-
ferences in pre-liberalization tariﬀ levels and country size. Section 10 also relates the
theory to growth accounting: the partitioning of cross-section diﬀerences in incomes
into their ultimate sources. Conclusions are contained in Section 11.
2. Preferences, Technology, and Closed Economy Equilibrium
The Eaton-Kortum model is Ricardian, with a continuum of goods produced
under a constant-returns technology. The new idea is a two-parameter probabilistic
model that generates the input requirements for producing each good. It will be
4useful to introduce this model of a technology in the simpler context of a single,
closed economy before turning to the study of a model of a world of n countries in
Section 3.
We develop a purely static model in which labor is the only primary (non-
produced) factor of production, and production requires only labor and produced,
intermediate goods as inputs. In the model, there are L consumers, each of whom
supplies one unit of labor, to which no disutility is attached, and produces and con-
sumes a single good in quantity c.3 This ﬁnal good is produced with labor services








of a continuum of produced goods. We call these produced goods “tradeables,” with
an eye toward the role they will play in later sections.
Individual tradeable goods are in turn produced with labor and the tradeables
aggregate (2.1). Thus, consider a given tradeable q(u). Let s(u) be the labor used to
produce this good and let qm(u) be the level of the materials aggregate q,d e ﬁned in
(2.1), used to produce q(u). The production technology relating these inputs and the





Total factor productivity (TFP) levels x(u)−θ vary across goods. As in Eaton and
Kortum (2002), we model the individual x(u) as independent random variables, expo-
nentially distributed with parameter λ. These are then ampliﬁed in percentage terms
3We call L population, p the price of the consumption good, LPc total nominal GDP, and c real
GDP per capita. This usage will be ﬁne through the development of the theory in Sections 2-5.
When we calibrate and apply versions of the model, we will need to interpret these variables more
carefully so as to accomodate physical and human capital diﬀerences.
5by the parameter θ.4 Note that a low x-value means a high productivity level (and a
low unit cost).
To build a theory on this basis, we need to put enough structure on these func-
tions of u so that the integral in (2.1) has meaning. Instead of doing this directly,
we re-label the goods as follows. The only parameter that varies across these goods
u is this productivity level x(u),a n da l lg o o d sq(u) enter symmetrically in the aggre-
gate (2.1). It will be convenient, then, simply to re-name each tradeable good by its











where λ is the parameter of the exponential distribution from which productivities





We speak of “good x”, and so on.
It is important to emphasize that these productivity draws x are economy-wide
eﬀects. Anyone is free to produce any speciﬁc good, and every producer of that good
has access to the same production technology (2.3), with the same stochastic intercept
x−θ, as other producers do. Since (2.3) is a constant-returns technology the number
of ﬁrms producing any good will be indeterminate, but whatever that number is, no
single producer has any market power and all prices will be set at marginal cost,
equivalent to minimum unit cost.
The production of the non-tradeable ﬁnal good is given by a Cobb-Douglas func-






4We are using θ for the parameter that Eaton and Kortum call 1/θ, so that in this paper a larger
θ means a larger variance in individual productivities.
6The labor and tradeables inputs allocated to each production process must sum to





−λxs(x)dx =1 , (2.5)







To sum up, feasible per capita allocations are numbers y,sf,q,q m, and qf and func-
tions s(x),q(x), and qm(x) on R+ that satisfy (2.2)-(2.7).
Let the prices of individual tradeables be p(x).P r o d u c e r so fa l lk i n d sw i l lc h o o s e
purchases of the individual goods so as to obtain the tradeables aggregate at minimum
unit cost pm, say. That is, they will solve












































7Similarly, given the price w of the labor input and the aggregate materials price
pm, a ﬁnal goods producer will choose labor and goods inputs so as to minimize the
unit cost p of the ﬁnal good. That is,
































Finally, given a price w of the labor input and an aggregate tradeable goods price
pm, any particular tradeable goods producer x will choose labor and goods inputs so
as to minimize the unit cost p(x) of his production, q(x). That is, he will solve
p(x)q(x)=m i n
 ,q


































In this Ricardian model, we can ﬁrst solve for the equilibrium prices p, pm,a n d
p(x) in terms of the wage w. Then we can use these prices to calculate equilibrium



































The integral in brackets is the Gamma function Γ(ξ), evaluated at the argument
ξ =1+θ(1 − η). Convergence of the integral requires
1+θ(1 − η) > 0, (2.17)











5If η were too large to satisfy (2.17), the integral in (2.16) would not converge. Economically, this
would mean unbounded production of the tradeable aggregate, as labor is concentrated on goods
where x is near zero (where x−θ is very high). Changes in the parameter η will aﬀect the units in
which tradeables are measured, and hence relative prices that depend on these units. The allocation
of labor and materials between the two sectors is independent of the value of η.S e en o t e7 .













Notice that all these prices, p, pm, and p(x) are diﬀerent multiples of the wage rate w.
This is a labor theory of value: Everything is priced according to its labor content.
The shares of labor and materials inputs in the output value of each tradeable









Using (2.6) we have qf = βq and then the relative price formula (2.18) gives
1 − sf =( AB)
1/βλ
−θ/βqf. (2.22)






















The two equations (2.22) and (2.23) can be solved for sf and qf:
sf = α (2.24)
and
qf =( 1− α)(AB)
−1/βλ
θ/β. (2.25)
10From these equations, all equilibrium quantities can be calculated, just as equi-
librium prices can be calculated from (2.18)-(2.20). National income per capita, in
dollars, is w, and this must equal per capita nominal GDP, pc. Multiplying the ﬁgures
by L gives the economy totals. Real GDP per capita, which equals utility in the units











The technology proposed by Eaton and Kortum for the production of tradeables,
described in the last section, involves a continuum of goods, produced under constant
returns with labor requirements that vary in a smooth, exogenously given way, de-
ﬁned by the parameter pair (λ,θ). This is a close descendant case of the technologies
proposed by Dornbusch, Fischer, Samuelson (1977) and Wilson (1980). An interna-
tional trade theory based on this technology can thus be developed along the lines of
these papers.
Speciﬁcally, we consider an equilibrium in a world of n countries, all with the
structure described in Sections 2, in which trade is balanced. Let total labor en-
dowments be L =( L1,...,Ln),w h e r eLi is the total units of labor in i.T h e e x -
ponential distributions that deﬁne each country’s technology have the parameters
λ =( λ1,...,λ n). Labor is not mobile. We use w =( w1,...,wn) for the vector of
wages in the individual countries. Preferences and the technology parameters θ,β,α
and η are common to all countries. The structure of production in each country is
exactly as described in Section 2, except that now tradeables are traded, subject to
transportation costs and tariﬀs.
11Transportation costs are deﬁned in physical, “iceberg” terms: we assume that
one unit of any tradeable good shipped from j to i results in κij units arriving in i.
Interpreting the terms κij as representing costs that are proportional to distance, it is
natural to assume that κij > 0,κ ij ≤ 1, with equality if i = j, κij = κji for all i,j,
and
κij ≥ κikκkj for all i,j,k. (3.1)
We also want to consider tariﬀs that distort relative prices but do not entail a
physical loss of resources. In practice, trade barriers take many forms, but here we
consider only ﬂat rate tariﬀsl e v i e db yc o u n t r yi on goods imported from j,a n dw h e r e
the proceeds are rebated as lump sum payments to the people living in i.D e ﬁne ωij
to be the fraction of each dollar spent in i on goods made in j t h a ta r r i v e sa sp a y m e n t
to a seller in j.
In the closed economy analysis of Section 2 we exploited the assumptions of
competition and constant returns to solve for all equilibrium prices as multiples of
the wage w,w i t hc o e ﬃcients depending only on the technology. With this done, we
then calculated equilibrium quantities. This same two-stage procedure can be applied
to the case of many countries, though of course each stage is more complicated.
A new notation for the commodity space is needed. Let x =( x1,...,x n) be the
vector of technology draws for any given tradeable good for the n countries. We refer
to “good x,”a sb e f o r e ,b u tn o wx ∈ Rn
+. Assume that these draws are independent






Use qi(x) for the consumption of tradeable good x in country i,a n dqi for consumption









denotes integration over Rn
+.) Let pi(x) b et h ep r i c e sp a i df o rt r a d e a b l eg o o d











−ηqi,i =1 ,...,n. (3.3)




















which reﬂect both production costs (labor and intermediate inputs) and transporta-















Note that without assumption (3.1), the right side of (3.4) would not necessarily be
the least cost way of obtaining good x in country i.
The price index pmi of tradeables in i must be calculated country by country. We
derive an expression for pmi from (3.2) and (3.4). The derivation uses two well-known
properties of the exponential distribution:





x and y independent, x ∼ exp(λ), y ∼ exp(µ),
and z =m i n ( x,y) ⇒ z ∼ exp(λ + µ). (3.6)






































and property (3.6) implies that z ≡ minj zj is exponentially distributed with pa-
rameter
Pn
j=1 ψij. Applying (3.2) again, this proves that pi(x)1/θ is exponentially




















































We view (3.9) as n equations in the prices pm =( pm1,...,pmn), to be solved for
pm as a function of the wage vector w. I ti st h es a m ef o r m u l aa s( 7 )a n d( 9 )i nE a t o n
and Kortum (2002). The solution to (3.9), which will be studied in detail in Section
144, is the analogue to (2.19) in Section 2. Notice that the country identiﬁer i appears
on the right side of (3.9) only via the parameters κij and ωij.
Next we calculate the tradeables expenditure shares for each country i : The
fraction Dij of country i0s total per capita spending pmiqi on tradeables that is spent






where Bij ⊂ Rn
+ is the set on which j attains the minimum in (3.4). Using (3.3) and
(3.4), this integral can be evaluated to obtain the expression (3.11) (below) for Dij.
One can also show that the Dij will simply be the probabilities that for a partic-
ular good x, the low price vendor for buyers in i are sellers in j. These probabilities
can be calculated directly, using a third fact about exponential distributions:
x and y independent, x ∼ exp(λ),a n dy ∼ exp(µ)




From (3.4) we have















































By (3.5), the random variable on the left of the inequality is exponential with pa-
rameter ψij. By (3.5) and (3.6), the random variable on the right is exponential with
parameter
P















j Dij =1 .
15We now impose trade balance. Under this assumption, the dollar payments for
tradeables ﬂowing into i from the rest of the world must equal the payments ﬂowing
out of i to the rest of the world. Firms in i spend a total of Lipmiqi dollars on





reaches sellers in all countries. (The rest is collected in taxes, and rebated as a lump
sum to consumers in i.)
Buyers in j spend a total of LjpmjqjDji dollars for tradeables from i,b u to ft h i s
total only
LjpmjqjDjiωji
reaches sellers in i. The rest remains in j, as rebated tax receipts. Trade balance








must hold. Notice that the term LipmiqiDiiωii–country i’s spending on home-
produced tradeables–appears on both sides of (3.12). Cancelling thus yields the
usual deﬁnition of trade balance: payments to foreigners equal receipts from foreign-
ers.
Our strategy for constructing the equilibrium in this world economy draws on
the analysis of a single, closed economy in Section 2. As in that section, we ﬁrst note
that all prices in all countries can be expressed in terms of wages. In the present case,
wages are a vector w =( w1,...,wn) and we express the coeﬃcients φij as functions of
w and pm, a n dt h e nu s et h en equations (3.9) to solve for the prices pm =( pm1,...,pmn)
as a function pm(w) of wages. This problem is the subject of Theorem 1 in the next
section. With tradeables prices expressed as functions of wages (and of the tax rates
16and other parameters involved in (3.9)), (3.11) expresses the expenditure shares Dij
as functions of wages and of tax rates, too. Then (3.12) can be viewed as an equation
in wages w and the vector q of tradeables consumption per capita.
The impact of the rest of the world on the behavior of individual producers in
i is entirely determined by pmi. In the absence of taxes–if ωij =1for all i,j–the





Also in the absence of taxes, the equilibrium quantities can be calculated from the
relative price pmi/wi, exactly as we did in Section 2. In this case, (2.24) implies that
sfi = α, and then the share formula (2.21) implies
βLipmiqi =( 1− α)Liwi. (3.13)





LjwjDji(w),i =1 ,...,n. (3.14)
We do not need to restrict the transportation cost parameters κij to reduce (3.12) to
(3.14) because the eﬀects of these costs are entirely captured in (3.9).
Theorem 2 in the next section provides conditions that ensure that (3.14) has
as o l u t i o nw, but since our objective is to be able to analyze the eﬀects of changes
in tariﬀ policies, we cannot stop with this special case. Nor can we make use of the
share formulas (2.21) to simplify (3.12) in the general case: The presence of indirect
business taxes implies that (3.13) will not hold. Taxes appear in (3.9) too, but they
appear separately in (3.12) because tax receipts are recycled back to consumers as
lump sum transfers. To deal with the general case, it will be useful to review the
national income and product accounts for a country i.
17TABLE 1
Value-added in services Labor income in services
Lipici − Lipmiqfi Liwisi
Value-added in tradeables Labor income in tradeables
P
j LjpmjqjDjiωji − Lipmiqmi Liwi(1 − sfi)





j6=i Dij(1 − ωij)
GDP Total labor income plus indirect taxes
Lipici Liwi + Lipmiqi
P
j Dij(1 − ωij)
Table 1 provides the accounts for country i, viewed as a three sector economy. All
entries are in dollars. The left side gives value-added in each sector; the right side
g i v e sf a c t o rp a y m e n t s( l a b o rp a y m e n t sp l u si n d i r e c tb u s i n e s st a x e s ) . T w oo ft h e s e
sectors are services (ﬁnal goods) and tradeables. The third is an importing sector, in
which ﬁrms buy tradeable goods from both home and foreign producers, pay import
duties to their own government, and resell the goods to home producers. This is a
constant-returns, free-entry activity, so of course selling prices must be marked up
exactly to cover the taxes. If ωij =1 , the entries for this sector would be zero in both
columns. To verify that the three sector value-added terms sum to GDP, one needs
to use the trade balance condition (3.12).
We now use these accounts as an aid in calculating the fraction sfi of country i’s





18denote the fraction of country i’s spending on tradeables that reaches producers (as
opposed to the home government). We will verify
sfi(w)=
α[1 − (1 − β)Fi(w)]
(1 − α)βFi(w)+α[1 − (1 − β)Fi(w)]
. (3.16)
Evidently, without taxes Fi =1and (3.16) implies that sfi = α.
To verify (3.16), we use the share formulas from both producing sectors, the
resource constraint (2.6) on tradeables, and the trade balance condition (3.10). The
share formulas in ﬁnal goods production are










LjpmjqjDjiωji = βLipmiqiFi (3.18)
and
Lipmiqmi =( 1− β)
n X
j=1
LjpmjqjDjiωji =( 1− β)LipmiqiFi. (3.19)
where the second equality is each line follows from trade balance (3.12) and the
deﬁnition of Fi. From (3.19) and the fact that qi = qfi+ qmi we have that
qfi = qi[1 − (1 − β)Fi]. (3.20)




pmiqi[1 − (1 − β)Fi] , (3.21)
and (3.21) and (3.18) imply
wi(1 − sfi)=βpmiqiFi. (3.22)
19Finally, eliminating pmiqi between (3.21) and (3.22) and simplifying yields (3.16).
We next use the formulas (3.15), (3.16) and (3.22) to reduce the trade balance
equation (3.12) to a system of n equations in the n wage rates w, just as we derived
























Dji(w)ωji − Liwi(1 − sfi(w))
#
. (3.24)
We sum up this section in the
Deﬁnition.A n equilibrium is a wage vector w ∈ Rn
++ such that Zi(w)=0for
i =1 ,...,n, where the functions pmi(w) satisfy (3.9), the functions Dij(w) satisfy
(3.11), the functions Fi(w) satisfy (3.15), and the functions sfi(w) satisfy (3.16).
As in the closed economy analysis of Section 2, the full set of equilibrium prices
and quantities are readily determined once equilibrium wages are known. The unique
solution to (3.11), analyzed in Theorem 1 in the next section, gives tradeable goods
prices, as we will describe in Theorem 1 in the next section. Then (3.11) describes
the allocation of every country’s spending on tradeables, and (3.15) and (3.16) give
6Calling equations (3.24) an “excess demand system” could mislead, since goods prices have
been solved for (in terms of wages) and trade balance has been used in its derivation. The equations
describe excess demands for each country’s labor only, as functions of wages, just as in Wilson
(1980). But whatever terminology one prefers, (3.24) has the mathematical properties of excess
demand systems that will let us apply standard results from general equilibrium theory.
20the equilibrium allocation sfi of labor in country i. Then (3.17) and (3.18) determine
qi and qfi. Final goods production ci is determined by (2.4).
4. Existence of Equilibrium
The economy we analyze is speciﬁed by the technology parameters α,β,η and
θ, common to all countries, the country-speciﬁc populations and technology levels
L =( L1,...,Ln) and λ =( λ1,...,λn), the transportation parameters [κij], and the tax
parameters [ωij]. All these numbers are strictly positive. Moreover, we impose
Assumptions (A):
(A1) α,β < 1,
(A2) 1+θ(1 − η) > 0,
and for some numbers κ and ω,
(A3) 0 <κ≤ κij ≤ 1 and 0 <ω≤ ωij ≤ 1.
Under these assumptions, we study the existence and (in the next section) the
uniqueness of solutions to the excess demand system (3.24). Before turning directly to
these issues, Theorem 1 characterizes the function pm(·):Rn
++ → Rn
+ relating trade-
able goods prices to wage rates, deﬁned implicitly by equations (3.9). Then Theorem
2 shows that the excess demand system (3.24) satisﬁes the suﬃcient conditions for a
theorem on the existence of equilibrium in an n-good exchange economy. Theorem 3,
in Section 5, gives one set of assumptions that imply that this solution is unique.
To study (3.9), it is convenient to restate (3.8) and (3.9) in terms of the logs
e pmi =l o g ( pmi) and e wi =l o g ( wi) of prices and wages:








[(1 − β)e pmj + β e wj]}λj
!
,
i =1 ,...,n. Deﬁne the function f : Rn × Rn → Rn so that these n equations are
e pm = f(e pm, e w). (4.1)

















∂fi(e pm, e w)
∂e pmj
=( 1− β)ξij.
The Jacobian of the system e pm − f(e pm, e w) with respect to e pm is then I − (1 − β)S.
We note that S is a stochastic matrix (ξij > 0 for all i,j and
P
j ξij =1for all i)a n d
that β ∈ (0,1), so that the inverse of this Jacobean is the strictly positive matrix







If (3.9) has a diﬀerentiable solution e pm(e w), its derivatives are given by the formulas
∂e pm
∂ e wk
=[ I − (1 − β)S]
−1βξk, (4.4)
where ξk =( ξ1k,...,ξnk) denotes the k-th column of S.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions (A), for any w ∈ Rn
++ there is a unique pm(w)
that satisﬁes (3.9). For each i, the function pmi (w) is
(i) continuously diﬀerentiable on Rn
++,
(ii) homogenous of degree one,
(iii) strictly increasing in w,
(iv) strictly decreasing in the parameters κij and ωij,a n d
(v) satisﬁes the bounds
pm(w) ≤ pmi (w) ≤ pm(w),
for all w ∈ Rn






























where for each k, ξk =m i n i ξik and ξk =m a x i ξik.
Proof. That the homogeneity and monotonicity properties (ii), (iii) and (iv) must
hold for any solution is evident from the properties of the functions fi(e pm, e w) in
w,κij,ωij,a n dpmi. To verify the bounds (v), note ﬁrst that if κijωij = a for all i,j












for all i. This fact together with properties (iii) and (iv) implies that any solution to
( 3 . 9 )m u s ts a t i s f yt h eb o u n d s( v ) .
For given w ∈ Rn
++ deﬁne the set C by
C = {z ∈ R
n :l o g ( pm(w)) ≤ zi ≤ log(pm(w)), all i}.
Under the sup norm
kzk =m a x
i
| zi |,
C is compact. We ﬁrst show that f(·, e w):C → C. To see this, we write f(z, e w;ω,κ)
to emphasize the dependence on ω and κ. Then for any z ∈ C, (ω,κ) and e w,w eh a v e
log(pm(w)) = f(log(pm(w)), e w;1,1) ≥ f(z, e w;ω,κ),
using the bounds (v), the monotonicity properties (iv), and the fact that f is increas-
ing in z. Likewise,
log(pm(w)) = f(log(pm(w)), e w;ω,κ) ≤ f(z, e w;ω,κ).
23We next show that f(·, e w) is a contraction on C by verifying the Blackwell suﬃcient
conditions. We have already observed that f(·, e w) is monotone. Let a>0 and apply






(z + a(1 − v))a




= fi(z)+( 1− β)a,
using the formula below (4.2) and the fact that
P
j ξij =1for all i.T h u sf(·, e w) has
the discounting property
fi(z + a) ≤ fi(z)+( 1− β)a.
The contraction mapping theorem then implies the existence of a unique ﬁxed point
e pm(e w) for f and a unique solution pm(w) to (3.9).
The Jacobian of the system (4.1) has the inverse (4.3), so the implicit function
theorem implies that e pm(e w) is continuously diﬀerentiable everywhere. To verify the
b o u n d s( v i ) ,w eu s et h ef a c tt h a tξk is the largest coordinate in ξk and write ξk ≤ ιξk,
where ι is a vector of ones. Thus (4.4) implies
∂e pm
∂ e wk
≤ [I − (1 − β)S]
−1βιξk. (4.8)
Now Sι = ι,s i n c eS is a stochastic matrix, implying that
[I − (1 − β)S]ι = βι
or that
[I − (1 − β)S]
−1βι = ι.









This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ¤
To prove that an equilibrium exists, we will apply an existence theorem for an
exchange economy with n goods to the demand system Z(w) deﬁned in (3.24).
Theorem 2: Under assumptions (A) there is a w ∈ Rn
++ such that
Z(w)=0 .
Proof.W ev e r i f yt h a tZ(w) has the properties
(i) Z(w) is continuous,
(ii) Z(w) is homogeneous of degree zero,
(iii) w · Z(w)=0 for all w ∈ Rn
++ (Walras’s Law),
(iv) for k =m a x j Lj > 0,Z i(w) > −k for all i =1 ,...,n and w ∈ Rn
++,
and
(v) if wm → w0,w h e r ew0 6=0and w0




m)} →∞ . (4.9)
Then the result will follow from Proposition 17.C.1 of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green (1995), p. 585.
(i) The continuity of pmi is part (i) of Theorem 1. The continuity of the functions
Dij is then evident from (3.8) and (3.11). The functions Fi deﬁn e di n( 3 . 1 5 )a r e
continuous, and are uniformly bounded from below by ω. The functions sfi deﬁned
in (3.16) are continuous. The continuity of Z then follows from (3.24).
(ii) From Theorem 1, pmi is homogeneous of degree one. Then (3.8) and (3.11)
imply that the Dij are homogeneous of degree zero, and it is immediate that Fi, sfi,
and Zi a l lh a v et h i sp r o p e r t y .







Djiωji − Liwi(1 − sfi)




























The proofs of parts (iv) and (v) are in Appendix A. ¤
5. Uniqueness and Computation of Equilibrium
In this section we establish a suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium of Section 4
to be unique. To do so, we add to Assumption (A) the assumption that the import
duties ωij levied by country i are uniform over all source countries j, so that we write
ωij = ωi for i 6= j and ωii =1 . The main result of this section is
Theorem 3. If assumptions (A) hold, if ωij = ωi for all i 6= j, and if
(κω)
2/θ ≥ 1 − β, (5.4)
α ≥ β, (5.5)
and




there is exactly one solution to Z(w)=0that satisﬁes
Pn
i=1 wi =1 .
Proof. In Appendix B, we use the results from Theorem 1, (iii) and (v), to establish
that Z has the gross substitute property:
∂Zi(w)
∂wk
> 0 for all i,k, i 6= k, for all w ∈ R++.. (5.7)
26(Since Z is homogeneous of degree zero, (5.7) will imply that
∂Zi(w)
∂wi
> 0 for all i, for all w ∈ R++.)
Then the result will follow from Proposition 17.F.3 of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green (1995), p. 613.
Direct inspection of the suﬃcient conditions (5.4) and (5.6) shows that they
are satisﬁed if the tariﬀ and transportation costs are small enough, that is if ω and
κ are close enough to one. For the parameter values for α, β and θ proposed in
Section 6, conditions (5.4) and (5.6) are only satisﬁed for small tariﬀs. For instance, if
α =0 .75, β =0 .5 and θ =0 .15, condition (5.4) is satisﬁed if tariﬀs and transportation
cost are no higher than 2.5% each (i.e. κω ≥ 0.95 ). For the same parameters,
condition (5.6) is satisﬁed if tariﬀs are no higher than 40% (i.e. ω ≥ 0.6). Condition
(5.5), requiring α>β , is easily satisﬁed for the benchmark calibration presented later
on.
Of course, the conditions (5.4)-(5.6) are suﬃcient, not necessary, conditions for
the gross substitute property to obtain. For the case of two countries, it can be shown
that (5.6) alone is suﬃc i e n ta n d( 5 . 4 )a n d( 5 . 5 )a r en o tr e q u i r e da ta l l .O u rn u m e r i c a l
experience also conﬁrms that the gross substitutes property holds under much wider
conditions than (5.4)-(5.6), including quite high tariﬀ and transportation costs.
We ﬁnish this section by discussing the algorithm that we use to compute equi-
librium. The gross substitutes property established in Theorem 3 suggests the use












Then we deﬁne the function T, mapping ∆w into itself as follows:
T (w)i = wi (1 + νZi(w)/Li) ,i =1 ,...,n, (5.8)
27where ν is an arbitrary constant satisfying ν ∈ (0,1]. To interpret (5.8), notice that
Zi (w)/Li is country i0s labor excess demand per unit of labor. Thus, T prescribes
that the percentage increase in country i’s wage be in proportion to a scaled version
of country i’s excess demand. To see that T : ∆w → ∆w, note ﬁrst that T (w)i ≥ 0 if
1+νZi (w)/Li ≥ 0, since Zi is bounded below by −Li by part (iv) of Theorem 2.
Note second that for any w ∈ ∆w
n X
i=1
















where the last equality uses Walras’ Law. To calculate T(w) numerically, one ﬁrst
needs to calculate pm(w), the solution to (3.11). We used an algorithm based on the
contraction property of the function f,d e ﬁned in (4.1) and used to prove Theorem 1.
This function T is closely related to a continuous time version of the tatonnement
process. To see this, interpret T dynamically as giving the value T(w) to w(t + ν)
whenever w(t) takes the value w. Then (5.8) becomes
1
wi(t)













Although (5.9) diﬀers from the standard tatonnement process, given by dwi/dt =
ci Z (wi (t)) for some constant ci, it has the same stability properties : If Z satisﬁes
the gross substitute property, the diﬀerential equation (5.9) converges globally to the
unique equilibrium wage. A proof that (5.9) converges to the unique equilibrium can
be constructed by showing that L(w)=m a x i {Zi (w)/Li} is a Lyapounov function
for this system. In our computational experiments, we found that setting the param-
eter ν of (5.8) equal to one always produced monotone convergence, in the sense of
sequences with decreasing Lyapounov functions L(w).
286. Calibration
The general structure of the theory is now in place. In the rest of the paper,
we will use a series of algebraic examples and numerical simulations to get an under-
standing of the properties of the model, of its ability to account for some of the main
features of world trade, and of its implications for the eﬀects of some simulated policy
changes. We intend these inquiries to be quantitative, so we will need estimated val-
u e sf o rt h ep a r a m e t e r sθ,α,β and η that are assumed to be constant across economies,
and for the endowments L =( L1,...,Ln), the technology parameters λ =( λ1,...,λ n),
and the matrices [κij] and [ωij] that describe transportation costs and tariﬀ policies.
For the substitution parameter η used in forming the tradeables aggregate, we
used a conventional value of 2: The results we report are not at all sensitive to this
choice.7 For α and β, we use the estimates 0.75 and 0.5, based on U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis data and related data from other countries from the United
Nations and the World Bank. Conceptually, in our theory, β is the share of labor
in the total value of tradeables produced, and α is closely related to the fraction
sfi of employment that is in the non-tradeables (ﬁnal goods) sector. We discuss the
relationship of these theoretical magnitudes to observation, and then review recent
evidence.
The theory divides production into two categories: tradeables and non-tradeables.
Provisionally, we used value-added, employment, and capital in agriculture, mining,
and manufacturing in the U.S. to estimate value-added, employment, and capital in
“tradeables” production. Using the BEA input-output tables, the value-added share
of these sectors was about 0.2 for the U.S. for the years 1996-99, consistent with an α
7S e en o t e5 .T h ep a r a m e t e rη does not aﬀect the expenditure shares Dij (see (3.11)), and so does
not aﬀect the variables Fi and si (see (3.15) and (3.16)), and so does not aﬀect equilibrium wages
(see (3.24)).
29value of 0.8. Using employment shares would yield α =0 .82, and ﬁxed capital shares
would imply α =0 .73.
In fact, according to World Development Indicators (WDI at http://www.worldbank.org)
data for the U.S. for the same years, trade in goods was only about 77% of total trade
(exports plus imports over two) in goods and services. The average of this ﬁgure for
the countries listed in Table 2 (below) is 0.8. These ﬁgures led us to augment the
tradeables share to 0.25 = .2/.8. We use α =0 .75 in all the simulations reported
below.
The United Nations Common Database (UNCDB at http://unstats.un.org) for
1993 reports value-added in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing averaging around
0.3 for the OECD countries, and levels ranging to 0.5 and higher for poorer countries.
The OECD input-output tables (http://www.oecd.org) for 1990 imply an α value
of .72 for the OECD countries. In short, 0.75 seems a reasonable value for α in
the industrialized world. It is a serious overstatement for economies that are still
substantially pre-industrial.
To calibrate the parameter β, we need to think of the primary factor Li as
“labor-plus-capital” or perhaps as “equipped labor” and to identify wiLi with total
value added, not just compensation of employees. Based on the BEA input-output
tables for 1996-99, the ratio of value added in manufacturing to the total value of
production in this sector was about 0.38. This ﬁg u r ec a nb ec o m p a r e dt ot h eU . N .
(UNIDO Industrial Statistics database) estimate of a world average value of 0.38 in
manufacturing for 1998. The OECD input-output table for 1990 gives an average of
0.38 in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. Since labor’s share in most services
is higher, including tradeable services in total tradeables would require a higher value
of β. For instance, in the 1997 U.S. input-output table, the average of the ratio of
value added to gross product across sectors, weighted by the share of each sector in
U.S. exports, is 0.5. Based on these considerations, we use β =0 .5 throughout this
30paper.
The parameter θ describing the variability of the idiosyncratic component to
productivity is central in quantitative applications of the theory. Its role in the
theory is analogous to the role played by elasticities of substitution in theories based
on the Armington assumption that goods produced in diﬀerent countries appear as
separate goods in utility functions. In either the Armington context or this one, the
estimation of these parameters is related to the estimation of transportation and other
costs, since all these factors interact top r o d u c et h et r a d ep a t t e r n sw eo b s e r v e .
Eaton and Kortum (Sections 3-5) obtain joint estimates of θ and trade cost using a
bilateral “gravity” formula implied by the theory and bilateral trade data and prices of
individual goods. They obtain an estimate of θ =0 .12. Other, similar estimates range
from 0.08 to 0.28. Their estimated trade cost (transportation plus tariﬀs and other
artiﬁcial barriers) corresponding to θ =0 .12 is large: 28% for neighboring countries up
to 66% for distant pairs. Anderson and Wincoop (2004) survey analogous bilateral,
gravity-type estimates of the (assumed uniform) Armington substitution elasticity.
The connection, based on the bilateral gravity formula, is θ =1 /(σ − 1),w h e r eσ is
the elasticity.8 They conclude, based on several studies, that a reasonable range is
σ ∈ [5,10], which corresponds to θ ∈ [0.11,0.25]. B a s e do nt h e s eﬁndings, we report
numerical experiments based on θ values of 0.1, 0.15, and 0.25.9
As remarked, the estimation of trade barriers is related to the estimation of θ.
Anderson-Wincoop (2004) also report direct evidence of transportation costs–freight
charges–on the order of 4% for the U.S. using trade weights and 11% for simple
averaging. Adding interest costs on cargo in transit may add 9%. Such estimates
applied to the world at large support an estimate of κ =0 .9. This estimate would be
8See Anderson and Wincoop (2004), pp. 19-22.
9More recently, Broda and Weinstein (2005) have estimated import weighted elasticities for the
US of 10.35 for the period 1972-88 and of 5.36 for the period 1990-2001 (Table 5).
31consistent with a θ value at the low end of the range we explore. Indirect statistical
evidence using distance measures, presence or absence of common borders, and the
like can support κ values as low as 0.65. In most of our simulations we used κ =0 .75,
applied symmetrically to pairs i,j with i 6= j, which is consistent with an intermediate
estimate of θ.
Some direct evidence on tariﬀ costs is given in column (4) of our Table 2, described
below. They range from 5% or less for wealthy economies (which account for almost
all trade) to as high as 40% for some poor ones. Values like this show up in many
studies. Most experts think that non-tariﬀ barriers are at least as important, but they
are hard to quantify. Anderson and Wincoop review evidence from OECD countries,
where non-tariﬀ barriers are estimated to be equivalent to an 8% tariﬀ.I ns o m eo fo u r
simulations, we assume the value ω =0 .9, applied uniformly to all foreign suppliers.
Neither the endowments L =( L1,...,Ln) nor the technology parameters λ =
(λ1,...,λn) can be observed directly, and the problem of inferring their values from
characteristics we can observe will be a focus of Section 8 and 10. Here we simply
describe the limited, aggregate data set we use for this and other purposes.
We use the 2002 WDI cdRom to assemble a cross-section of the 59 economies
with the largest total GDPs. These countries and the variables measured for each are
listed in Table 2. We also include a residual, rest-of-world category (with 5 percent
of world GDP), treated as the 60-th economy. Column (1) of the table is the Penn
World Table measure of per capita real GDP. We used this variable to order the
countries. For each country, ﬁve variables are recorded, along with the utility gains
from a simulated tariﬀ reform that will be described in Section 9.
Column (1) is total GDP, denoted Y =( Y1,...,Yn). These are IMF-based nominal
values, converted to U.S. dollars at market exchange rates (where available). They
are not on a purchasing power parity basis. In the table they are expressed as frac-
tions of total world GDP. These ﬂows, and all the import and export ﬂo w st h a tw e
32used were averaged over the years 1994-2000 in order to reduce the importance of
trade imbalances and year to year ﬂuctuations, about which the theory evidently has
nothing to say.
Column (2) is trade volume, denoted V =( V1,...,V n),d e ﬁn e da st h ea v e r a g eo f
the values of imports and exports, also from the 2002 WDI cdRom, divided by GDP.
Both imports and exports are deﬁned to include services as well as goods.
Column (3) reports the ratio of the consumption goods deﬂator for each country
to an index of the prices of machinery and equipment, from the 1996 benchmark year
in the Penn World Table. We will use them as observations P =( P1,...,Pn) on the
prices (p1/pm1,...,pn/pmn) in the theory.
Column (4) of Table 2 lists estimates of average 1996-2000 import tariﬀ rates for
each country. These are unweighted averages of ad valorem tariﬀs applied to diﬀerent
commodities. They are available in the World Bank database “Data on Trade and
Import Barriers,” and are described in Dollar and Kraay (2004). (For the three
countries for which we do not have tariﬀ data, indicated by asterisks, we substituted
tariﬀs from a second source: ratios of import duties to imports, from WDI 2002. For
the residual ROW, we used the average of the rest of the column.)
Column (5) contains simulation results that are discussed in Section 9. Column
(6) is a 1994-2000 average of per capita income, on a purchasing power basis, from




The algorithm proposed in Section 5 makes it easy to compute equilibria with
many countries, diﬀering arbitrarily, but it will be instructive to work through some
examples ﬁrst that are simple enough to solve by hand. We derive the predictions
33of special cases of the theory for the behavior of trade volumes and the gains from
trade, as measured by the eﬀects of changes in trade on real consumption.
For future reference, we start with the derivation of some useful formulas for trade
volumes and gains, under the assumption–used also in Theorem 3–that tariﬀsa r e
uniform: ωij = ωi for all i 6= j. We ﬁr s td e r i v ee x p r e s s i o n sf o rt h ev a l u eo fi m p o r t s
Ii and the volume of trade vi, deﬁned as the ratio of the value of imports to GDP.





From the share formula (3.22), using (3.18) to eliminate sfi, and collecting terms,
Ii = Liwi
(1 − α)
α +( β − α)Fi
(1 − Dii). (7.1)
Now GDP equals wages plus indirect business taxes,
Lipici = Liwi + Ii (1 − ωi),




(1 − α)(1− ωi)











β(Dii/(1 − Dii)+ωi)+1− ωi
. (7.3)
Notice that (1 − α)/β is an upper bound for vi.
Using these formulas, we consider ﬁrst the case of costless trade: κij = ωij =1 ,
all i,j. This is the analogue of the zero-gravity case analyzed in Section 4.4 of Eaton
and Kortum (2002). We solve for each country’s wages wi, the prices of non-tradeable
goods relative to tradeables pi/pmi,t h es h a r e si nw o r l dG D PLiwi/
P
j Ljwj,a n dt h e
34volume of trade vi, all as functions of the parameters Li and λi. With costless trade
every country buys the intermediate inputs from the same lowest cost producer, so























Notice that the expenditure shares Dij do not depend on the identity i of the importer.
With ω =1 , expression (3.18) gives sfi = α, and the excess demand functions (3.24)





















where the parameter π, which does not depend on i, will be set by whatever normal-
ization we choose for w. Compare to equation (22) in Eaton and Kortum (2002).






a geometric mean of productivity in tradeables λi and labor in eﬃciency units Li.
Notice that if θ =0 , so that there is no variation of productivities, then country
i’s GDP Liwi is simply Li. Using (2.12) and (7.5), the price of the ﬁnal non-tradeable













35so that countries with high productivity λi in tradeables have a high relative price













In this world of costless trade, then, data on GDPs Yi a n do nr e l a t i v ep r i c e sPi can
be used to infer each country’s labor endowment Li and its tradeables productivity
parameter λi. We will see in Section 10 that the idea of using relative price data Pi
to separate the eﬀects of Li and λi on production can also be applied in the general
case where tariﬀ and transportation costs are positive. The volume of trade vi in the













Our second example explores a diﬀerent special case. We study a symmetric
equilibrium with equal sized countries Li = L =1 , identical technologies, λi = λ,a n d
uniform transportation costs and tariﬀs, described by
κij = κ and ωij = ω if i 6= j
and κii = ωii =1 . In these circumstances, there will be a common equilibrium wage
wi = w, all i. We normalize it to w =1 . E v e r y o n ew i l lf a c et h es a m et r a d e a b l e sp r i c e




(1 + (n − 1)(κω)1/θ)
θ/β λ
θ/β. (7.11)
10The idea that countries with a more advanced technology will have a high relative price of
non-tradeables is known as the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect (Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964)).
36The price of ﬁnal goods is given by (2.12), which with w =1and pm given by (7.11)
yields
p =
α−α(1 − α)−1+α (AB)
(1−α)/β
[1 + (n − 1)(κω)1/θ]θ(1−α)/βλ
θ(1−α)/β. (7.12)
With w =1 , (3.11) implies
Dij =
(κω)1/θ
1+( n − 1)(κω)1/θ





1+( 1+βω − ω)(n − 1)(κω)1/θ/β
. (7.13)
Nominal GDP per capita in this example is
pc =1+I (1 − ω)=1+vpc(1 − ω),
with v given by (7.13), and consumption, or utility per unit of labor, is given by
c =
1




We calculate the utility gain from eliminating a tariﬀ ω. Denote by c,I and p the
levels of consumption, imports, and the consumption price corresponding to a tariﬀ




=[ 1− v(1 − ω)]
µ
[1 + (n − 1)κ1/θ]
[1 + (n − 1)(κω)1/θ]
¶θ(1−α)/β
. (7.15)
We use equations (7.13) and (7.15) to derive an expression for the gain Λ ≡
log(c0/c) of going from pure autarchy, ω =0 , to costless trade, κ = ω =1 . Specializ-





37In the last section we argued that the values α = .75 and β = .5 are empirically
reasonable, at least for the high income countries. Using the value 0.15 for θ, (7.16)
then implies the gain estimate
Λ =( .075)log(n).
We can think of n in (7.16) as the ratio of world GDP to the home country’s, so
that taking values from Table 2, n =3 .6 ∼ = 1/.28 for the United States, n =6 .2
for Japan, and n = 170 for Denmark. In percentage terms, this formula implies
beneﬁts of 10 percent of consumption for the U.S., 14 percent for Japan, and 38
percent for Denmark. These are fantasy calculations–even ideally free trade is not
costless trade–but they give useful upper bounds for the magnitude of gains we will
be discussing in the rest of the paper.
T h e s ee x a m p l e sm a k ec l e a rt h a tt h ep a r a m e t e r sd e t e r m i n i n gt r a d ev o l u m ea r e
informative about the welfare eﬀects of tariﬀs. To see this, notice that trade volume
given by (7.10) or (7.13) is a function of (1 − α)/β, which is the same expression
appearing in the welfare gains (7.16). Also observe that trade volume in (7.13) as
well as gains of trade in (7.16) are increasing functions of θ.
Next we return to the case of positive transportation costs and tariﬀs, retaining
symmetry. The properties of the volume and welfare gain functions deﬁn e di n( 7 . 1 3 ) ,
and (7.14)-(7.15) are illustrated in Figures 7.1 through 7.4. In all cases, we used the
values α =0 .75,β=0 .5, and κ = .75.I nt h eﬁgures, the values of θ and the tariﬀ
parameter ω are varied, as shown.
Figure 7.1 shows the gains of eliminating a tariﬀ corresponding to ω = .9 for
the same three values of θ. Of course, the gains from eliminating a 10 percent tariﬀ
are far smaller than the gains (7.16) of moving from autarchy. Notice too that the
gains in Figure 7.1 are not always decreasing in the the size of the country: This is
due to the eﬀect of the revenue from the tariﬀ. As the formula (7.15) makes clear,
38there are two eﬀects of eliminating a tariﬀ (setting ω =1 ). One is to reduce the
price of the ﬁnal, non-tradeable consumption good (that is, to increase p/p0). The
other is that tariﬀ revenues are lost. These eﬀects have opposing eﬀects on welfare,
and are stronger if n is large (i.e. if countries are small). The ﬁrst eﬀect must
dominate–eliminating the tariﬀ must be welfare improving–but the welfare gain
need not decrease monotonically in n. We have computed the gains from eliminating
at a r i ﬀ for diﬀerent ω values (not shown in Figure 7.1). Holding θ ﬁxed at 0.15, the
diﬀerence in the welfare gains from eliminating a 30 percent versus a 20 percent tariﬀ
is smaller than the diﬀerence between eliminating a 40 percent versus a 30 percent
tariﬀ. For countries that are 5 percent of world GDP or smaller, the gains from
eliminating a 30 percent tariﬀs are about 6 percent.
Figure 7.2 plots of the relation between the volume of trade, (7.13), measured as
t h er a t i oo fi m p o r tv a l u et oG D P ,a n dt h es i z eo ft h ee c o n o m y .T h ev o l u m eo ft r a d ei s
decreasing in size, and is bounded above by the ratio of (1 − α) to (1−(1−β)ω),w h i c h
equals 0.45 for our benchmark parameter values and ω =0 .9. Small economies have
trade volumes that nearly attain the bound. We have also experimented varying the
value of ω b e t w e e n0 . 7a n d1( n o ts h o w ni nF i g u r e7 . 2 ) .T h ee ﬀects of variation in ω
are large for economies of all sizes: for an economy that is 5 percent of world GDP,
trade volume increases from 10 percent to 27 percent, as tariﬀs are decreased from
30 percent to 10 percent.
Figure 7.1 - 7.2 refer to symmetric world economies, where all economies have the
same size and technology levels. These are not cross-sections. The scatter of points
in Figure 7.2 are GDPs, Yi, and Import to GDP ratios, Vi, for 60 large countries:
columns (1) and (2) in Table 2. These data are a cross-section. But the continuous
curve on the picture is calculated for a symmetric world, with a 10% tariﬀ (ω =0 .9)
just as in Figures 7.3 and 7.4, except that the x-axis is transformed to logs so that
one can see the observed pairs for small countries.
39The data and all of the parameter values used to compute the theoretical curve
in Figure 7.2 have all been discussed in Section 6. No adjustments have been made
to ﬁt the curve to the data. The theoretical curve reproduces the negative relation
between trade volume and size in the data, but implies a higher average trade volume
than the average implied by the data.
In a world with very diﬀerent national policies toward trade one would not ex-
pect equal trade volumes at each GDP level, even if the assumptions underlying the
construction of Figure 7.2 were correct: The points should not lie on the theoreti-
cal curve. If the theory were accurate, the rich economies with similar and more or
less free trade–roughly, the OECD–should be near the curve, and the protectionist
economies should fall below it by varying amounts.
There are also four striking outliers in the ﬁgure: Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia,
and Belgium, with trade volumes much higher than others’, and much higher than
our theoretical upper bound. It is a characteristic of port cities that a high volume
of goods passes through, counted as imports when they enter and exports when they
leave. Countries in which such ports are important would appear as “low β” coun-
tries in our parameterization, so it is possible that relaxing the assumption that β is
uniform across economies would yield a better ﬁt of the volume-size curves in Figures
7.5 and 8.2, below.
There is some evidence supporting this interpretation of the outliers in Figure
7.2 as low-β port cities. The UN Statistics Division (Commodity Trade Statistics
Database: COMTRADE) collects data on re-exports of goods–exports of goods
that have been imported with no local value added–for 50 countries, 10 of which
are in our 60 country data set. Of the four outlying high-volume countries in Figure
7.2, only Hong Kong has re-export data. Hong Kong reports that goods re-exports
averaged about 85% of total goods exports during 1994-99. Since goods exports were
about 86% of total exports, removing re-exports from total exports would lead to
40a reduction in the estimated trade volume in Hong Kong from 1.4 to 1.4 × (.14 +
.86 × .15) = .38, or to about the level of the theoretical curve in Figure 7.2. For
the other 50 countries in the COMTRADE data set, re-exports are less than 10% of
goods exports, and for most countries they are less than one percent of the total.
INSERT FIGURES 7.1 - 7.2
8. Volume of Trade
The algorithm described in Section 5 lets us replace the theoretical curve in Fig-
ure 7.2, based on an assumption of symmetry, with the volume predictions of the gen-
eral theory, calibrated to ﬁtt h eactual distribution of economies by size. In addition,
the general theory lets us incorporate other kinds of international diﬀerences–for
example, diﬀerences in tariﬀ policies–into the trade volume predictions. We do this
in this section, in two ways.
Once the assumption of identical countries is dropped there is no reason for equi-
librium wages to be equal, and if they are not, observed GDPs Y cannot be taken as
direct observations on labor-capital endowments L. Even without tariﬀ distortions,
Yi will be the product wiLi, and neither w nor L can be directly inferred from obser-
vations on Y . What can be done about this depends on what other data are used.
We discuss several possibilities in the next three sections.
The simplest calibration method uses the theory to infer w and L from the data
on Y only. To do this, it seems a natural starting point to think of the parameter λi
in any country as proportional to that country’s eﬀective labor endowment Li. That
is, we assume that if country 1 has twice the labor endowment of country 2, that
country will also have twice as many “draws” from the distribution of productivities.
With exponentially distributed productivities, this means λ1 =2 λ2, and in general,
that the vector λ is proportional to the endowment vector L. This assumption of
41uniform ratios λi/Li surely has more appeal than assuming uniform levels λi. In the
latter case, there would be enormous diseconomies of size: Denmark would be the low
cost producer of as many goods as the United States is, but with its much smaller
workforce, Danish wage rates would be bid up to much higher levels than wages in
the U.S.11 Of course, these are not the only possibilities. The assumption λ = kL is
at best a kind of steady state or very long run hypothesis, in the spirit of Kremer’s
(1993) idea that the stock of useful ideas should be proportional to the number of
people.
Under this assumption, the equilibrium condition
Z(w,L,λ)=0 , (8.1)
written so as to emphasize the dependence of the excess demand system Z on L and
λ, is specialized to Z(w,L,kL)=0 . The choice of the constant k is just a matter of
the units chosen for tradeables and labor input. We set it equal to one:
Z(w,L,L)=0 . (8.2)
A second set of equations in the variables w and L is given by the GDP-equals-national
income conditions
L · ε(w,L)=Y, (8.3)
where εi(w,λ) is wi adjusted for indirect taxes using the function of the equilibrium








11See the costless trade formula (7.5), for example. Note that although the hypothesis λ = kL
avoids an unrealistic diseconomy of scale, it leaves in place an unrealistic scale economy.I n t h e
theory, transportation costs within an economy, no matter how large, are taken to be zero. Insofar
as the parameters κij measure the resources used in moving goods over space, this is a deﬁciency
that can only be ﬁxed by introducing some actual geography.
42(Notice that without tariﬀs, ωi =1and εi(w,λ)=wi.) We view (8.2) and (8.3) as
2n equations in the pair (w,L),g i v e nt h ed a t aY .
We describe the algorithm used to solve (8.2)-(8.3). Deﬁne w∗(λ,L) to be the
function that solves (8.1). Its values can be calculated using the algorithm described










Then ϕ maps the n-dimensional simplex ∆n into itself, and if L is a ﬁxed point of ϕ,
the pair (w∗(L,L),L) satisﬁes (8.2)-(8.3). We located a ﬁxed point by iterating using
(8.5), applying the algorithm from Section 5 to compute w∗ at each iteration, from
an initial guess for L. In practice, this algorithm always converged to a ﬁxed point.12
Figure 8.1 displays the equilibrium wages calculated in this way as a function
of size (GDP share). The benchmark parameters used in Figures 7.1-7.2 were used,
and the same range of θ values. The equilibrium wages are increasing with size,
reﬂecting the scale economy in transportation enjoyed by larger economies. Since the
technology level λ is assumed proportional to size L in the construction of the ﬁgure,
it cannot provide a second source of wage variation.
Given equilibrium wages and endowments computed in this way, the analogues to
Figures 7.1-7.2 are readily constructed. We were surprised to ﬁnd that the new ﬁgures
constructed in this way were very similar to the ﬁgures based on the assumption of
equal size countries and wage equality, even though these two sets of assumptions
seem very diﬀerent.
This ﬁnding is illustrated in Figure 8.2. This ﬁgure is the exact analogue to
Figure 7.2, except that the very high volume countries have been left oﬀ so as to
12Indeed, under the assumptions of Theorem 3 it can be shown that ϕ : int(∆n) → A ⊂ int(∆n),
where A is closed and convex, and that ϕ is continuous, so that the existence of a ﬁxed point follows
from Brouwer’s theorem.
43get higher resolution on the others. The volume and GDP data used in both ﬁgures
are the same. The theoretical curve plotted in Figure 7.2, based on a symmetric
model with identical countries and uniform wages, is reproduced on Figure 8.2, as
is a new second curve, constructed by solving the general equilibrium system with
endowments L calibrated in the way we have just described. Despite the completely
diﬀerent computational methods used to construct them the two curves are very
similar, except for the largest economies–Japan and the U.S.–where the symmetric
model predicts a smaller volume than the more realistic one does. This is due to
the eﬀects of size on wages in the calibrated economy, shown on Figure 8.1. The
implication we draw from the similarity of the two curves is that even though an
economy’s size relative to the world economy matters for the determination of trade
volume, the way the rest of the world is conﬁgured matters very little.
INSERT FIGURES 8.1 - 8.2
Neither of these curves is a particularly good ﬁt: They pick up the eﬀects of
size on trade volume, and nothing else. Some other factors were remarked on in our
discussion of Figure 7.2, and other possible inﬂuences will occur to anyone. Here
we examine the possible eﬀects of tariﬀ policies, under the assumption–also used
in Sections 5 and 7–that each country i imposes a uniform tariﬀ factor ωi on all
countries j.
We introduce tariﬀs simply by repeating the simulation (8.2)-(8.3) with a uniform
tariﬀ factor of ω =0 .9 replaced by the vector Ω =( Ω1,...,Ωn) of observed tariﬀ
factors, obtained from the tariﬀ rates from column (4) of Table 2, interpreting Ωi as
the uniform tariﬀ factor that country i imposes on all imports. Results are shown on
Figure 8.3, based on the same GDP and volume data as Figures 7.2 and 8.2. The
o’s are the data, the continuous curve is obtained from the calibrated model with a
uniform tariﬀ ω =0 .9. The asterisks are predictions from the calibrated model using
44the tariﬀ factors Ω implied by Table 2, column (4).
INSERT FIGURE 8.3
As a basis for comparison, we ran a regression of volume on GDP and tariﬀs
levels for the 60 countries. The results were
log(ˆ Vi)=a − (0.23)log(Yi) − (0.029)(100)(1 − Ωi). (8.4)
The associated R2 was .34.13 The same statistic but with the estimates ˆ Vi of Vi
calculated from the theory (the x’s on Figure 8.3) was also R2 =( .58)2 = .34.W i t h
the uniform tariﬀ imposed, the comparable statistic was R2 =( .45)2 = .20. The slope
parameters in (8.4) are freely chosen to ﬁt the data. The eﬀect of tariﬀs derived from
the calibrated model was not selected in any way to improve the ﬁt, and no actual
tariﬀ data (beyond average levels) was used in the calibration. Yet the tariﬀsh a v e
exactly the same (considerable) ability to improve the ﬁt when constrained to work
through our theory as with a freely chosen regression coeﬃcient.
We also experimented with making κij a function of the distance between coun-
tries, and by taking into account the free trade agreements between countries in our
data set. In both cases the simulated trade volumes became more correlated with the
trade volume from the data, but the changes were small.
To model the eﬀect on distance on transportation cost we let dij be the dis-
tance between countries i and j, measured in linear miles between the capitals of
the two countries, normalized so that the average distance equals 1. We let κij =
κ exp(−δ0 (dij − 1)), so that δ0 has the interpretation of the elasticity of transporta-
tion cost with respect to distance. Using δ0 =0 .05, a number consistent with the
empirical literature, we found that the correlation between the (log) model trade
volume and the (log) trade volume in the data is 0.61.
13We obtained only slightly diﬀerent estimates when the four countries with trade volumes ex-
ceeding 0.75 were excluded from the regressions.
45To model the eﬀect of the free trade agreements we let ωij =1for any two
countries with a free-trade agreement, and otherwise used the tariﬀs described in
Table 2. We considered the European Union, NAFTA, CEFTA and Mercosur. In
this case we found that the correlation between the (log) model trade volume and the
(log) trade volume in the data was 0.60.
9. Gains from Trade
In Section 7 we studied the gains from trade using the autarchy versus costless
trade example and hypothetical tariﬀ reductions in the context of a symmetric world
economy. In this section, we incorporate diﬀerences among countries in a more real-
istic way, using the general version of the theory calibrated to the actual world GDP
distribution and the measured tariﬀ factors Ω used in Section 8.
Results of a speciﬁc, world-wide tariﬀ reduction are described below and dis-
played in ﬁgure 9.2. But before turning to these results, it will be helpful to study
the eﬀects of unilateral tariﬀ changes in a small economy, or to calculate the “best-
response function” for a small economy, taking the tariﬀ policies of rest of the world
as given. Studying this problem will help us to interpret the results of a uniform,
multilateral tariﬀ changes.
We focus on the case of economy 1, say. We use the notation L−1 =( L2,L 3,...L n) and
λ−1 =( λ2,λ 3,...,λn) to denote the parameters corresponding to countries other than
1, and similarly with w−1,c −1, and pm−1. Assume that country 1 applies a uniform
tariﬀ ω to all its imports, and assume that all other countries apply a common tariﬀ
b ω to country 1’s exports. Our interest is in analyzing the behavior of country 1’s
welfare (ﬁnal goods consumption) c1 as a function of the pair (ω,b ω).
To make precise the idea that country 1 is small, consider a sequence of world
economies {Lr,λ
r} with (Lr,λ
r) → (L,λ), and with λ
r
1/Lr
1 = k>0 along the
sequence. Let {wr,c r,p r
m} denote the corresponding sequence of equilibrium values,
46and let (w, c, pm) be the corresponding equilibrium values of the limiting economy.
In Appendix C we establish that as Lr
1 → 0, the limiting behavior (w−1,c −1,p m−1) of
the other n − 1 economies is equal to the equilibrium of a world economy with
n−1 countries and endowments (L−1,λ −1), and that the limiting behavior of economy
1, (w1,c 1,p m1), is given by
w1 =
∙




(1+θ)/(θ+β) ˆ w1, (9.1)
c1 = ω
(1−α)/(θ+β) [1 + (β − 1)ω]




θ+β ˆ c1, (9.2)
and
pm1 =ˆ pm1 /ω 1, (9.3)
where the numbers ˆ pm1, ˆ w1 and ˆ c1 do not depend on ω, b ω and k.
The expression (9.2) can then be used to calculate the optimal tariﬀ:t h el e v e l
of ω that maximizes utility c1 for country 1. One can show, provided that β<α ,
that there is a unique ω∗ that maximizes c1 and that the optimal tariﬀ is strictly
positive (that ω∗ ∈ (0,1)) and increasing in θ. This result is quite intuitive. For small
θ values, there are small diﬀerences across countries, and hence a given increase in
tariﬀs produces a large decrease in the demands for the products of country 1. Con-
sequently, the optimal tariﬀ is decreasing in θ. Figure 9.1, based on (9.2), illustrates
the way utility c1 varies with ω for diﬀerent θ values. The vertical axis in the ﬁgure
is log(c1(ω)) − log(c1(1)).
Should we be surprised at this persistence of market power as the economy be-
comes vanishingly small? Equation (9.3) states that as a buyer of tradeable goods
the limit economy 1 is a price-taker. The set of tradeables it produces for home use
has zero measure zero and it has no eﬀect on the pre-tax price ˆ pm1 of the tradeables
aggregate. But under the Eaton-Kortum technology, any economy, no matter how
47small, has some goods which it is extremely eﬃcient at producing, and even a small
country can serve a large part of the world market for these particular goods. In
our case, this market power cannot be exploited by individual sellers, because others
in the same economy have free access to the eﬃcient, constant returns technology.
B u ta sF i g u r e9 . 1i l l u s t r a t e s ,i tc a nb ee x p l o i t e db yt h eg o v e r n m e n t . S i n c ew ed o
not permit export duties, the way to restrict supply of these goods is through import
tariﬀs.14
INSERT FIGURE 9.1
It follows from these observations that a Nash equilibrium of a world-wide tariﬀ
game involving many small countries would involve strictly positive tariﬀ levels for
every country. We did not compute such an equilibrium. Instead, we calculated
the analogue to the equilibrium shown in Figure 8.3 that results when the observed
tariﬀ factors Ω are replaced with the free-trade factors (1,1,...,1). We then calculated
the percentage increase in consumption that each country would receive under this
elimination of tariﬀs. These gains are reported in Column (5) of Table 2.15 They are
shown in Figure 9.2, plotted against each country’s initial tariﬀ rate, (1 − Ωi) × 100.
14A similar point is made in Helpman and Krugman (1989) and Gros (1987), in a context of
imperfect competition. This analysis of the optimal tariﬀ applies only for the small open economy
case, but we have numerically veriﬁed for our calibrated economy that the calculations in Figure
9.1 are an excellent approximation for all but the largest economies. Compare to the Eaton and
Kortum (2002, p. 1774) ﬁnding that if the U.S. were to reduce its tariﬀs on manufacturing goods
unilaterally, it would suﬀer a welfare loss of about .0005%.
15The overall magnitude of these estimates is within the rather wide range of estimates of static
gains from tariﬀ elimination that other economists have obtained. For example, Anderson (2004,
Table 1) reports estimates of the gains from a hypothetical “full global liberalization” carried out
in 2005 that range from $254 to $2080 b.(1995 dollars). Using an estimate of 2005 world GDP in
1995 dollars of $32000b. (our calculation) the implied range in percent is 0.8 to 6.5. Most studies
are nearer the lower end of this range. Our estimates are also similar to those reported by Eaton
and Kortum (2002) for the mobile labor version of their model.
48Figure 9.3 reports the results of the same calculation, with the welfare gains plotted
against size to facilitate comparison with Figure 7.1.16
INSERT FIGURES 9.2 AND 9.3
O n ec a ns e et h eo p t i m a lt a r i ﬀ s t r u c t u r ei nF i g u r e9 . 1r e ﬂected in the U-shaped
pattern of gains from trade shown in Figure 9.2. The ﬁgure shows the eﬀect of a tariﬀ
reform beginning from a situation in which tariﬀs vary realistically cross-sectionally
and ending with all tariﬀs at zero. In the post-reform situation, every country would
l i k et oh a v ei t st a r i ﬀ at the best response to a world of zero tariﬀs. Countries with
initial tariﬀs near this level lose the most from moving their own tariﬀs to zero, though
they still gain from others’ tariﬀ reductions. Countries with very high initial tariﬀs
gain from a reduction to the optimal tariﬀ, but then lose some of these gains back as
they continue toward zero. Countries with very low initial tariﬀs were never at their
optimal tariﬀ, so they only gain from others’ reductions. From Figure 9.3, we can
see two features already present in the symmetric example of Figure 7.1: ﬁrst, for
small countries with tariﬀsn e a r1 0 %b o t hﬁgures give similar estimates of the welfare
gains and, second, that the gains from trade are larger for smaller countries. Using
the averages presented in Table 2, the world wide cost of the current level of import
tariﬀs is 0.5% of world GDP and 31% of world tariﬀ revenues.
10. Sources of Income Diﬀerences
As equations (7.7)-(7.9) of the costless trade example suggest, cross-section ob-
servations on the relative prices of tradeables and non-tradeables can be used to
identify the vectors L and λ separately, in which case the proportionality assumption
16Incorporating distance into the transportation cost and incorporating the main free trade ag-
greements in the modeling of [ωij] a se x p l a i n e di ns e c t i o n8h a v ev e r ys m a l le ﬀects on patterns for
the estimated welfare eﬀects of a world trade liberalization.
49λ = kL can be dropped. We base our ﬁnal simulation on this idea.










for all i, where the notation emphasizes that the right side can be computed as a
function of w and λ. Write ψ(w,λ) for the n-vector of right side values, and view
the relative prices on the left as the theoretical counterparts to the observed relative
prices Pi in column (3) of Table 2. Then we can obtain estimates of w,L, and λ by
solving
Z(w,L,λ)=0 , (10.1)
L · ε(w,λ)=Y, (10.2)
and
ψ(w,λ)=P, (10.3)
where ε is deﬁned implicitly in (7.2). The system (10.1)-(10.3) consists of 3n equations
to be solved for the 3n unknowns w,L, and λ. To solve this system, we used an
algorithm that parallels the one described in Section 8.
The asterisks in Figure 10.1 are the equilibrium wages implied by this calculation,
plotted against the log of GDPs. The circles in the ﬁgure are the equilibrium wages
from the analogous calculation described in Section 8, in which the ratios λi/Li are
constrained to equal a common value. (Neither reported calculation uses tariﬀ data,
b u tw eh a v ec a r r i e do u tv e r s i o n st h a td os o :T h eﬁgure is not much aﬀected.) One
can see that constraining λi/Li to be constant suppresses most of the cross-country
variability in equilibrium wages, relative the case where variations in λi and Li are
permitted to exercise independent inﬂuences. The two log standard deviations in the
upper right of the ﬁgure quantify this diﬀerence.
INSERT FIGURE 10.1
50In these calculations relative price data were used to identify these eﬀects sepa-
rately. Cross-country data on real wages of labor at equal skill levels could have been
used for this purpose, too, or some combination of the two. One can see from Table
2 that the observed relative prices Pi are strongly correlated with per capita GDPs.
This is also true of the equilibrium wage rates wi obtained by solving (10.1)-(10.3),
and we believe it would be true of measured wages as well (though controlling for
international skill diﬀerences would not be easy, and we have not carried this latter
comparison out).
Interpreting the simulation results in this section and in Section 8 entails a kind
of cross-country accounting of the sources of income diﬀerences, similar to growth
accounting based on time-series data. In Sections 8 and 9, where λi is constrained to
be proportional to Li, individuals in all countries are viewed as drawing production-
related ideas from a common distribution. Productivity diﬀerences for individual
goods are just a matter of chance and these diﬀerences average out over the whole
economy. Diﬀerences in overall production are almost all due to diﬀerences in resource
endowments: population and human and physical capital per person.
Of course, the focus of Sections 8 and 9 was on the determination of trade ﬂows
and the consequences of policy changes that aﬀect these ﬂows, and we think we have
made some progress on these questions. It is reassuring that the simulations of this
section, with λi/Li left free, give very similar answers on the volume of, and gains
from, trade as the constrained simulations do.
11. Conclusion
We think of this paper as a kind of trial run of a particular version of the Eaton
and Kortum trade theory. As we formulated the theory, the problem of solving
for equilibrium prices and quantities can be reduced to solving for the vector of
equilibrium wages in the n countries that comprise the world economy, very much
51along the lines of Wilson’s (1980) analysis. We have shown that such an equilibrium
exists under reasonable conditions and that under somewhat tighter assumptions
it will be unique. We have proposed and tested an algorithm that is essentially a
tatonnement process for calculating equilibria. We have discovered that “toy versions”
of the theory can provide surprisingly accurate approximations to predictions about
wages, trade volumes and gains from trade, so pencil-and-paper calculations can be
used to provide inexpensive checks on quantitative conjectures and to help interpret
simulation results.
For the most part, objects in the theory match up naturally to counterparts in
the national income and product accounts, input-output accounts, and standard trade
statistics. This makes much of the calibration easy to carry out, lets us focus attention
sharply on small regions of the theory’s parameter space, and facilitates interpretation
of simulation results. These features are essential to successful quantitative economics.
The calibrated model accounts fairly well for the overall volume of world trade
in the year 2000, and for the way volume varies cross-sectionally with an economy’s
size and tariﬀ levels. With its assumption of continuous trade balance, the theory is
obviously not designed to interpret short term ﬂuctuations. We have not tested the
theory’s ability to account for trends in trade volumes (as studied, for example, in Yi
(2003)) nor have we responded to Kehoe’s (2002) challenge to provide a satisfactory
account of the eﬀects of NAFTA or other important trade agreements. These issues
are high on our agenda, as they are on every quantitative international economist’s.
We have kept the analysis in this paper on a strictly static basis, in order to keep
complications within bounds and to understand better the connections with other
trade theories. The cost of this decision was to leave the model’s many connections
to growth theory and public ﬁnance unexplored. A more satisfactory treatment of
physical capital is needed, in which the dynamics of capital accumulation can be
examined as well as the contributions of capital to current production. Capital goods
52play a large role in trade, so it is natural to conjecture that tariﬀ and other barriers
have large eﬀects on the return to investment and hence on capital accumulation and
growth. We are currently exploring this topic. Another natural direction, already
examined by Eaton and Kortum (1999), will be to introduce technology diﬀusion by
introducing a law of motion for the parameters λ. Perhaps in some combination such
extensions can help us to discover the long-sought theoretical link between trade and
growth.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Theorem 2, (iv) and (v).










Djiωji − Liwi(1 − sfi)
#
≥− Li(1 − sfi) ≥− Li.
Proof of part (v). Suppose that {wm} is a sequence in Rn
++,t h a twm → w0 6=0 ,
and that w0
i =0for some i. We need to verify that (4.9) holds for this sequence. For
any w ∈ Rn































(1 − sj)Djkωjk − max
k
Lk.
56By Assumption (A), ωjk ≥ ω, implying in turn that the functions Fi take values in
[ω,1]. Then (3.18) implies that the shares 1 − sj are uniformly bounded away from



































































































Since the wm → w0 6=0with w0



















This veriﬁes (A.1) and hence (4.9) and completes the proof of Theorem 2. ¤
57Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 3.
We show that Z has the gross substitute property (5.7):
∂Zi(w)
∂wk
> 0 for all i,k, i 6= k, for all w ∈ R++..








α +( β − α)Fj
−
LiwiFi
α +( β − α)Fi
#
,
u s i n g( 3 . 1 8 )t os u b s t i t u t ef o rsj in (3.24) and using the fact that
(1 − α)βFj + α[1 − (1 − β)Fj]=α +( β − α)Fj.
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.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n gt h r e es t e p sw es i g ne a c ho ft h et h r e et e r m so ft h i sd e r i v a t i v e .
- Step (ia): If (5.4) holds, then ∂Dji/∂wk > 0 for all j 6= i. To see this, notice
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which is positive if (5.4) holds.
- Step (ib): If β ≤ α then for j 6= k, ∂(α +( β − α)Fj)/∂wk ≤ 0. To see this,
notice that under the assumption of uniform tariﬀs










(α +( β − α)Fj)=( β − α)(1− ωj)
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by (iii) in Theorem 1. Thus if (5.5) holds (if β ≤ α) then
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α +( β − α)Fk
¶
=
(Dki + wk∂Dki/∂wk)(α +( β − α)Fk) − wkDki(β − α)∂Fk/∂wk
[α +( β − α)Fk]
2
59In step (ia) we verify that (5.4 ) implies that ∂Dki/∂wk ≥ 0 so that it will suﬃce to
show that
Dki(α +( β − α)Fk) − wkDki(β − α)∂Fk/∂wk
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(α − β)(1− ωk)(β/θ)
[α +( β − α)Fk]
¸









[α +( β − α)Fk]
∙
1 −





[α +( β − α)Fk]
∙
1 −
(α − β)(1− ωk)
θ
¸
and thus if if condition (5.6) holds the inequality in step ii) is veriﬁed.
- Step (iii) For k 6= i, ∂ (Dii − Fi/[α +( β − α)Fi]) /∂wk > 0 .To see this, use
(B.1) so that
Dii − Fi
α +( β − α)Fi
=
−ωi (1 − Dii)













−ωi (1 − Dii)








−ωi (1 − Dii)




[α +( β − α)(ωi +( 1− ωi)Dii)]
2 > 0
60which establishes the inequality in step (iii).
This shows that Z satisﬁes the gross substitute property, and hence that the
equilibrium is unique. ¤
Appendix C: Behavior of the Limiting Economies
We verify that as Lr
1 → 0, the limiting behavior (w−1,c −1,p m−1) of the other n−1
economies is equal to the equilibrium of a world economy with n − 1 countries and
endowments (L−1,λ −1), and that the limiting behavior of economy 1, (w1,c 1,p m1),
satisﬁes (9.1)-(9.3). We proceed under the hypothesis that w1 ∈ (0,∞), which we








































The second equality deﬁnes ˆ pm1 and veriﬁes (9.3).













1 → 0, this fraction goes to zero for each j, limr→∞Dj1 (wr)=0 . Inspection of
the expression for Zi (w) then conﬁrms that when λ1 = kL1 =0the excess demand
system Z−1 (w) ≡ (Z2 (w),Z 3 (w),...Zn (w)) = 0 does not depend on w1, b ω,ω. The
continuity of Z implies that w−1 solving Z−1 (w1,(w−1)) = 0 is the desired limit.
T h en e x ts t e pi st od e r i v ea ne x p r e s s i o nf o rt h el i m i tf o re c o n o m y1 .W et a k e
w−1 as given in the previous step. For L1 > 0, we have that Z1 (w1,w −1)=0is equiv-
alent to Z1 (w1,w −1)/L1 =0 , so we analyze the latter expression. It can be shown,





































As λ1 = kL1 → 0, then D11 → 0, and hence F1 = D11 +( 1− D11)ω → ω. Thus,














α +( β − α)ω
(pm1)
(1−β)/θ .
Solving for w1 yields (9.1), where it can be seen that the factor ˆ w1 does not depend
on ω, b ω and k.





(1 − α)(1− ω1)










(1 − α)(1− ω1)




βω1 +( 1− ω1)
α +( β − α)ω1
¸
.
Using the expression for p1 in (2.12),
c1 =
1






βω +( 1− ω)
α +( β − α)ω
¸
.
Using the expression for pm1 in (9.3) and for w1 in (9.1),
c1 =
1






βω +( 1− ω)




















































This completes the proof. ¤
63                                          TABLE 2:  DATA AND SIMULATION RESULTS
       Size  Trade Volume  Relative Price   Tariff  (in %)   Welfare Gain Per Capita GDP
Country Name  GDP as % of  Imports /GDP  Consumption /  Mean across   of eliminating  PPP Adjusted
 World GDP Mach. & Equipt     goods tariffs, in percent       US =1
          Yi   [1]            Vi  [2]          Pi    [3]  100x(1-Ωi)  [4]                   [5]             yi    [6]
United States 27.99 0.10 1.37 5.40 0.15 1.00
Japan 15.69 0.08 1.65 5.48 0.25 0.83
Germany 7.35 0.27 1.48 5.86 0.41 0.76
Rest of the World 5.25 0.32 0.70 11.49 * 0.20 0.10
France 4.86 0.24 1.55 5.86 0.52 0.73
United Kingdom 4.30 0.28 1.28 5.86 0.56 0.70
Italy 3.85 0.25 1.27 5.86 0.59 0.71
China 2.86 0.22 0.70 (*) 18.58 0.47 0.10
Brazil 2.29 0.09 1.00 13.73 0.42 0.23
Canada 2.06 0.33 1.30 5.10 0.84 0.82
Spain 1.93 0.26 1.35 5.86 0.79 0.56
Mexico 1.40 0.29 0.72 14.26 0.56 0.26
India 1.34 0.13 0.70 (*) 33.44 2.79 0.07
Australia 1.32 0.17 1.13 5.30 0.94 0.76
Netherlands 1.31 0.48 1.51 5.86 0.89 0.75
Russian Federation 1.09 0.28 0.48 12.47 0.63 0.24
Argentina 0.94 0.11 1.02 12.40 0.66 0.39
Switzerland 0.91 0.31 1.70 0.68 * 1.56 0.88
Belgium 0.85 0.73 1.61 5.86 0.99 0.80
Sweden 0.80 0.39 1.61 5.86 1.00 0.71
Austria 0.72 0.35 1.57 5.86 1.02 0.79
Turkey 0.61 0.25 0.62 12.20 0.75 0.21
Indonesia 0.59 0.32 0.60 9.88 0.81 0.10
Denmark 0.58 0.35 1.50 5.86 1.05 0.82
Hong Kong, China 0.52 1.39 1.70 0.00 1.74 0.76
Norway 0.50 0.36 1.67 4.04 1.24 0.90
Thailand 0.49 0.49 0.64 18.00 0.91 0.21
Poland 0.47 0.27 0.65 15.55 0.81 0.25
Saudi Arabia 0.47 0.36 0.70 (*) 12.48 0.78 0.37
South Africa 0.47 0.24 0.70 (*) 8.30 0.92 0.29
Finland 0.41 0.34 1.39 5.86 1.10 0.70
Greece 0.40 0.19 1.08 5.86 1.10 0.48
Portugal 0.36 0.34 0.97 5.86 1.11 0.50
Israel 0.32 0.39 1.65 7.55 1.00 0.60
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.32 0.21 0.48 4.90 1.21 0.18
Colombia 0.31 0.19 0.70 (*) 11.70 0.85 0.20
Venezuela, RB 0.29 0.24 0.71 12.28 0.84 0.20
Malaysia 0.29 1.00 0.70 (*) 9.18 0.93 0.26
Singapore 0.29 1.62 2.02 0.16 1.78 0.67
Ireland 0.26 0.63 1.29 5.86 1.14 0.72
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.25 0.22 0.22 27.60 2.05 0.11
Philippines 0.25 0.48 0.67 11.22 0.88 0.12                                          TABLE 2:  DATA AND SIMULATION RESULTS
       Size  Trade Volume  Relative Price   Tariff  (in %)   Welfare Gain Per Capita GDP
Country Name  GDP as % of  Imports /GDP  Consumption /  Mean across   of eliminating  PPP Adjusted
 World GDP Mach. & Equipt     goods tariffs, in percent       US =1
          Yi   [1]            Vi  [2]          Pi    [3]  100x(1-Ωi)  [4]                   [5]             yi    [6]
Chile 0.23 0.29 0.82 10.25 0.91 0.28
Pakistan 0.20 0.18 0.76 39.90 5.16 0.06
New Zealand 0.19 0.26 1.29 4.84 1.25 0.61
Peru 0.18 0.16 0.72 13.30 0.88 0.15
Czech Republic 0.18 0.60 0.52 7.04 1.09 0.43
Algeria 0.16 0.27 0.70 (*) 24.60 1.63 0.16
Hungary 0.15 0.46 0.52 13.42 0.89 0.35
Ukraine 0.15 0.47 0.24 10.20 0.94 0.12
Bangladesh 0.14 0.15 0.68 21.30 1.27 0.05
Romania 0.12 0.31 0.38 16.03 0.95 0.21
Morocco 0.11 0.30 0.50 30.77 2.68 0.11
Nigeria 0.11 0.41 0.61 24.06 1.58 0.03
Vietnam 0.08 0.25 0.28 15.15 0.94 0.06
Belarus 0.08 0.62 0.30 12.63 0.92 0.20
Kazakhstan 0.07 0.40 0.37 1.15 * 1.71 0.16
Slovak Republic 0.06 0.64 0.43 6.88 1.14 0.32
Tunisia 0.06 0.45 0.40 31.17 2.77 0.18
Sri Lanka 0.05 0.41 0.57 7.67 * 1.09 0.10
Simple Average 1.67 0.370 0.94 11.26 1.12 0.41
Weighted Average 0.210 7.62 0.50
Sources:
  [1]: Share in world gdp. GDP in current dollars. From WDI 2002 cdRom, average 1994-2000
  [2]: 0.5*(Exports+Imports)/GDP, all in current dollars. From WDI 2002 cdRom, average 1994-2000
  [3]: Price of machinery and equipment relative to consumption, from benchmark PWT year 1996. 
        Average of other countries for ROW. The countries marked with (*) are not in the 1996 PWT benchmark,
        so we use the average for the other countries. [3] displays the reciprocal of this number.
  [4]: Average 1996-2000 ad valorem tariff rate, simple average across products, from Dollar and Kraay, 
        using worldbank database "Data on Trade and Imports Barriers", when available. When it is not available,
        indicated as *, import duties/imports from WDI 2002. Average of other 59 countries for ROW
  [5]: Calculations described in section 9, Figure 9.2
  [6]: Penn World Table average 1994-2000
  The Weighted averages are GDP weighted for Trade Volume and Welfare gains,












FIGURE 7.1: WELFARE GAINS FROM ELIMINATING A 10% TARIFF






























































































































FIGURE 8.1: WAGES VERSUS SIZE
Three values of θ 















































































FIGURE 8.3 VOLUME VERSUS SIZE
Data (o),  Model w/uniform tariffs (solid),  Model w/tariffs from Table 2 (*)
COUNTRY SIZE: log of share of GDP
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FIGURE 9.1: WELFARE EFFECTS OF TARIFF FACTOR ω FOR A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
Three values of θ



















































































FIGURE 9.2: WELFARE GAINS FROM ELIMINATING TARIFFS
TARIFFS BEFORE REDUCTION IN PERCENT: (1 - Ω






































































FIGURE 9.3: WELFARE GAINS FROM ELIMINATING TARIFFS









































































FIGURE 10.1: WAGES IN THE TWO CALIBRATIONS











σ (log w ) = 0.08 for constant λ / L
σ (log w ) = 0.63 for variable λ / L